“I think” in the Transcendental Deduction In section 16 of the Deduction (p. 246-248 in the Guyer-Wood edition, Kantian notation B132-B136), Kant claims about the representations belonging to a single thinker, that “only because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together my representations”.Describe the situation we would be in, according to Kant, if we could not “comprehend the manifold” of representations in a consciousness. Then explain in detail how, on his view, it is possible (after all) for us to “comprehend this manifold” in a consciousness.Does Kant’s view of how we ascribe representations to ourselves presuppose an understanding of what “I” refers to in “I think”?Does Kant give us a plausible way to understand self-consciousness (in particular, the ascription of thoughts to ourselves)? Why or why not?
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